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The Leases of Sacred Property at Mylasa:
An Alimentary Scheme for the Gods
A complicated relationship existed between the local shrine at Carian
Labraunda and the city of Mylasa in the second haIf of the third century B.C.
The correspondence between several kings, the priests of Zeus, and the city
attests to a long-lasting controversy between the city and the priests over the
shrine and its revenues. Both authorities appealed to the local dynast and the
HeUenistie kings, who acted as mediators and finaUy settled the whole affair. 1
The events reveal an independent economie and politieal role of the
sanctuary, and it would appear that the clash of interests between cult and
city was neither confined to a transitional period nor overcome by the city's
increasing control of the shrine.
However, Mylasa has yielded not only this fascinating dossier of epi-
graphie texts but also a large series of inscriptions whieh deal with the pur-
chase and lease of properties by sanctuaries. Although these land-Iease
documents differ from the third-century letters in character and content, they
have a common theme: "sacred finances and land". Many private landowners
transferred sorne or aU of their properties to a sanctuary but, peculiarly,
.immediately rented them back from the gods. 2 Apart from the Delian temple
accounts, the Carian land-Iease documents represent our largest record of
transactions concerning sacred properties.3 They come not only from the city
of Mylasa itself but also from Olymus, Hydae, Sinuri and Labraunda.4 These
four places 'were neighbouring communities and closely related to Mylasa.
Cf J. CRAMPA, Labraunda. Swedisb Excavations and Researcbes III 1. The Creek
Inscriptions, Part 1: 1-12 (Period ofOlympicbus), Lund, 1969 (henceforth ILabraunda 1).
2 Cf W. BLÜMEL, IK 34. Die Inscbriften von Mylasa I, Bonn, 1987 (henceforth IMylasa
0, nos. 202-232; ID., IK 35. Die Inscbriften von Mylasa II (henceforth IMylasa m, nos. 802-
854; also ID., Neue Inscbriften mis Mylasa (1989-1991) mit Nacbtriigen zu IX. 34, in EA,
19 (1992), no. 217 B (cf SEC 42 [1992], no. 999); ID., Inscbriften aus Karien I, in EA, 25
(1995), nos. 7-25 (cf SEC 45 [1995], nos. 1538-1555); there are many more unpublished
texts found by Louis Robert.
3 Cf D. BEHREND, Recbtsbistoriscbe Betracbtungen zu den Pacbtdokumenten aus
Mylasa und Olymos. Akten des VI. internationalen Kongresses far griecbiscbe und latei-
niscbe Epigrapbik, Munich, 1972, p. 146 with note 4.
4 Cf 1. ROBERT, Le sanctuaire de Sinuri près de Mylasa, 1ère partie: les inscriptions
grecques, Paris, 1945, nos. 11-15,46-72; ILabraunda 1, nos. 6-8.; IMylasa II, nos. 802-854.
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Towards the end of the third century B.C., they were "absorbed" by sym-
politeia and became subdivisions (demoi) of the greater Mylasean state.5
The texts have generally been dated to the second half of the second or
even the beginning of the first century B.C. However, Reger recently sugges-
ted that they should be attributed to the beginning of the second or even the
end of the third century B.C. His dating depends on his interpretation of
Rhodian coinage and the assumption that cities of Caria called the Romans
"common benefactors" as early as 188 B.e.6 Although Roman presence may
not be directly visible, the central ruler had definitely changed for Mylasa by
the middle of the second century B.e. In a contemporary honorary decreefor
a certain Menecrates, the Romans are named as KOWOl eùepyé'tut and this title
could have been used from 167 B.e. onwards, when the Romans declared
Caria free from Rhodian rule.7 1 find it problematic to date the leasing-docu-
ments twenty years earlier than this.8
Characteristics of the Land-leases
Neither the purchase, nor the lease of land by sanctuaries are surprising.
Harpocration cites the grammarian Didymus, who explains the term /!îcr8ro/!u
as the 'equivalent to "revenues from teméne", and as the means of meeting
the expenses of sacrifice.9 Although it did occur, it was the exception that the
renting out of the property of a god was forbidden. lO However, such leases
were subject to special laws. An early inscription from Athens gives
instructions to the archon basileus) who was in charge of the lease of sacred
land, to turn to the law about sacred domainsY Among other parallel
evidence is the main Delian law on the lease of sacred property (iepà
5 Cf IMylasa II, nos. 901-910 (Hydai); no. 913 (Chalketor); IMylasa 1, no. 102, with
LIVY, XLV, 25 and POLYB., XXX, 5, 15 (Euromus); ILabraunda 1, nos. 3-5; IMylasa II, no.
863, 1. 3; ROBERT, op. cit. (n. 4), no. 93 (Sinuri).
6 Cf G. REGER, The Date of the Land-Transfer Texts of Mylasa in Karia, an unpubli-
shed paper given at the Annual meeting of the APA (1995) and likewise ID., Agriculture
and the Rural Landscape of Hellenistic Mylasa (1996); this date makes the land-lease
documents almost contemporary with the controversy over the sanctuary at Labraunda;
for the conventional dating of the documents see IMylasa 1, p. 74.
7 Cf IMylasa 1, p. 38; Ch. HABICHT, Samische Volksbeschltïsse der hellenistischen
Zeit, in MDAI(A), 72 (1957), p. 248; A. ERSKINE, The Romans as common benefactors, in
Historia, 43 (1994), p. 70-87; J.-L. FERRARY, Philhellénisme et impérialisme. Aspects idéolo-
giques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique de la seconde guerre de Macé-
doine à la guerre contre Mithridate, Rome, 1988, p. 129f., note 290.
8 However, Prof. Reger draws on unpublished material; 1 cannot refute his dating at
this point.
9 Cf HARPOCRATION, A 196, s.v. àno I.ltcr8rofHhrov (KEANEy),
10 Cf for example IG n2 , 1289 (third century).
11 IG 13 , 84, 1. 5-7 (cf D. BEHREND, Attische Pachturkunden: Bin Beitrag zur Beschrei-
bung der misthosis nach den griechischen lnschriften, Munich, 1970 [Vestigia, 12], no. 6).
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｣ｲｕｙｙｐｬｘ＼ｐｾＩＮＱＲ Everywhere in the Greek world, contracts regarding leases of
sacred land showed similar characteristics and wording. It is the combination
of purchase and immediate hereditary lease to the former owner which
singles out the documents from Mylasa.
The land-transfers consisted of several legal transactions, whieh are
reflected by the following four types of documents: the decree by whieh a
tribe resolved to buy an offered property Ｈ Ｂ Ｌ ｾ ＼ ｰ ｴ ｣ ｲ ｬ Ａ ｬ ｘ Ｉ Ｌ the document of pur-
chase (ffivf]ç XPlll!lX'ttcrI!Oç), the document recording the taking over of the
property by the commissioners Ｈ ￋ Ｑ Ａ ｾ ｬ ｘ ｣ ｲ ｴ ￇ Ｉ Ｌ and the contract fixing the heredi-
tary lease (l!tcrElfficreroç XPlll!lX'ttcrI!Oç). The initial decree itself comprised the
following proceedings: the commissioners reported to the assembly that a
citizen was willing to sell a certain piece of land at a certain priee, a citizen
told the assembly that he or she was willing to rent these properties perma-
nent1y, and the trlbe decided to buy and leas.e out the property.13 The decree
concluded with the instruction to inscribe the XPlll!lX'ttcrl!Oç on the walls of
the respective sanctuary.14 At Mylasa and in the surrounding villages special
sub-divisions of the demos, not only the tribes but also so-called syngeneiai,
administered the community and were responsible for the land-Ieases. Apart
from this, the administrative procedures are comparable to those of other
poleis. 15
My examination of the inscriptions focuses on the overall purpose of the
leases and the role of the gods in the transactions. It draws on existing
studies of the Carian leases and on characteristies of leasing in the Greek
world in general. 16 Behrend carefully examined the legal aspects of purchase
and subsequent lease. He points out that the formula I!tcrEloûv Eiç nlX'tptKa,
whieh was in use already in the third century B.C., has its equivalents in the
expressions eiç <id, Eiç 'tov anlXv'tlX Xpovov, KlX'tà ｾｻｯｵ used elsewhere in the
12 ID 503.
13 Cf IMylasa I, p. 70f.
14 Cf BEHREND, arl. cit. (n. 3), p. 158.
15 Cf ROBERT, op. cit. (n. 4), p. 25-31; a syngeneia may be a subdivision of a phyle or
an institution preceding the tribe.
16 Apart from the works frequently referred to see for example M.H. ]AMESON, The
leasing of land in Rhamnous, in Studies in Attic Epigraphy, History, and Topography,
Princeton, 1982 (Hesperia, suppl. 19), p. 66-74; J.H. KENT, The temple estates of Delos,
Rheneia and Mykonos, in Hesperia, 17 (1948), p. 243-338; Ph. LEVEAU (ed.), L'origine des
richesses dépensées dans la ville antique, Actes du colloque organisé à Aix-en-Provence
par l'U.E.R. d'Histoire, les Il et 12 Mai 1984, Aix-en-Provence, 1985; R. MARTIN, Rapports
entre les stntctures urbaines et les modes de division et d'exploitation du territoire, in M.I.
FINLEY, Problèmes de la terre en Grèce ancienne, Paris, 1973, p. 97-112; R. OSBORNE, Social
and economic implications of the leasing of land and properly in Classical and Helle-
nistic Greece, in Chiron, 18 (1988), p. 279-323; M.B. WALBANK, Leases ofsacred properlies in
Attica, Parts 1-4, in Hesperia, 52 (1983), p. 100-135; p. 177-231; Part 5, Hesperia, 53 (1984),
p. 361-368; a correction, Hesperia 54 (1985), p. 140.
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Greek worldj leases from Ptolemaic Egypt show exactly the same phraseP
Such a lease entailed that the supreme right of possession remained with the
lessor (in other cases with the king), although the lessee received rights equi-
valent to those of an owner. This makes the leases at Mylasa a combination
of the usual land leasing mechanisms and the royal practice of giving out
land eiç 1ta'tptKa. The sanctuary gave up the right of managing the property
but enjoyed a regular rent and created a strong bond between the god and
the lessee. The lessee's strong position derived from the fact that the lease
was hereditary and could even be transferred to a third person, a process
which was called 1tapaxroP'Ilcnç. Although the cases resemble one another,
each lease shows special features. .
Why such a Large Number of Leases?
Scholars find it difficult to explain the existence of the series as a whole:
why was an apparently large proportion of the arable land of Mylasa in the
possession of sanctuaries? Why did such an enormous number of transac-
tions take place within a short period of time?I8 One might interpret the
transactions simply as the most practical way of living for both sides: while
the sanctuary preferred low-risk investments in landed property, the former
owners, who continued to farm the land, paid only a modest rent and were
able to spend capital on other investments. 19 This explanation, however,
does not account for the sudden appearance of so many transactions; unless
we assume a period of extraordinary prosperity of Carian sanctuaries.
In what follows, 1 want to refute current views briefly and then set out
my own hypothesis. Chance of transmission or a change in the way' of
recording leases cannot be the only reasons. 20 Undoubtedly, there was an
exceptional interest of landowners in selling their lands to the gods, and
these were exceptionally eager to invest in land. Ir has been suggested that
the reason for this eagerness was the "fear of pirates".21 But, if Mylasa suffe-
red from piracy22, this would encourage every landowner to keep landed
17 Cf BEHREND, art. cit. (n. 3), p. 148-153.
18 For reasons suggested see BEHREND, art. cit. (n. 3), p. 146-148: W. BLÜMEL, IMylasa l,
on nos. 202-232.
19 RIJC, p. 272.
20 Cf BEHREND, art. cif., p. 146, "dann müBten riesige Tempeldomanen entstanden
sein, von denen uns nichts bekannt ist".
21 Cf T.R.S. BROUGHTON, Roman Asia Minor, in T. FRANK (ed.), ESAR IV, p. 561:
R. BOGAERT, Banques et banquiers dans les cités grecques, Leiden, 1968, p. 270: BEHREND,
art. cif. (n. 3), p. 147.
22 Mylasa was far away from the sea but the Hellenistic decrees which award Mylasa
asylia indicate that the city or its territory did indeed suffer from raids: see K]. RIGSBY,
Asylia. Territorial Inviolability in the Hetlenistic \Var/d, Berkeley, 1996, nos. 187-209 (cf
IMylasa II, nos. 641-659, no: SEC 39 [1989], no. 1127: SEC 42 [1992], nos. 1003-1006).
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property. Private landowners who sold their property would also need to
protect considerable amounts of money.23 l therefore want to dismiss the
reason "piracy" as the decisive factor. What about political reasons? The
gods' landed property certainly formed an important part of the patterns of
land-holding throughout Caria. Although one must not underestimate the
social and political implications of changes in these patterns, l do not think
that political motives triggered the sales. As the gods' ownership of widely
scattered plots of land was a general feature, conclusions about the integra-
tion or political influence of the lessees of sacred land are problematic. 24
Were there economic advantages resulting from placing land under the
aegis of a temple? As Mylasa had been à<popoÀ6Y11'toç from the peace of
Apameia at the latest, tax exemptions would not have made religious centres
exceptional landlords. 25 However, we might still suspect advantages to do
with obligations levied by the city. The leases of sacred property show an
exceptionally low rate of interest, that is ca. 4% of the purchase price;26 but
the calculation and interpretation of such a rate of interest are problematic
and often ill founded; we need evidence that enables us to compare the
figures with rates of interest concerning land that is not qualified as sacred. l
propose to draw on an inscription from Sinuri, which has not received much
attention from scholars. 27 The basic situation described in the document has
analogies at Mylasa itself,. at Telmessus, Athens and Delphi: 28 at Sinuri, the
syngeneia appointed a certain Dionysius as one of the so-called hOtKOt,
whose task was to operate against people trying to encroach upon the
sacred domain of the god. 29 As soon as Dionysius and his colleagues had
managed to restore the Ëyyaux for the god and the syngeneia, they turnèd to
another matter. Certain people were accused of harming the syngeneia and
the god by claiming a lower pharos - simply because they lived on sacred
23 Cf BOGAERT, op. cit. (n. 21), p. 270.
24 Reger, who is currently working on a new publication of this dossier, including
new land-lease texts, believes that the land-leases are closely linked with the established
sympoliteia of Mylasa and the smaller communities; he argues that as a consequence, the
social position of the wealthy élite of the smaller towns was threatened and that the new
land-holding patterns resulted in a patchwork of properties which advanced the integra-
tion of the smaller states; 1 have my doubts about this explanation, but it is inappropriate
to elaborate these doubts in advance of the full publication of Professor Reger.
25 BEHREND, art. cit. (n. 3), p. 148, refers to LIVY, XXXVIII, 39, 8 and POLYB., XXI, 46.
26 Cf RIJG, p. 273; IMylasa l, p. 31; WALBANK, art. cif. (n. 16), p. 225.
27 Cf ROBERT, op. cif. (n. 4), no. 11; Robert dis'inguishes between "procès relatifs aux
domaines du dieu" (here we find no. 11), "commissaires pour l'achat de terrains", and
"domaines du dieu".
28 Cf ibid., p. 36; IMylasa l, no. 132, 1. 4-6 (sacred land of Aphrodite had been misap-
propriated); Recueil, no. 459, lOf (Telmessus); IG II2 , 1035; Syll.3, 826.
29 Cf ROBERT, op. cit. (n. 4), no. 11, 1. 6-9.
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land.3o Unfortunately, the inscription remains enigmatic but the expectation
of a low interest rate explains why people were generally interested in leasing
land from the godsY 1 accept this as the reason why private land-owners
would consider selling their property to gods.
However, why was it so cheap to rent from the gods? Were the sanctua-
ries welfare institutions? There is no indication that the citizens of Mylasa
and its neighbouring small communities went through a phase of economic
hardship so that they turned to the local sanctuaries for help, that is to free
them from debt and mortgage. As far as 1 can see, none of the estates carried
a mortgage. Nevertheless, 1 would argue that economic reasons were indeed
responsible for the programmatic land-transfers - but we have to emphasise
the economic needs of the other side involved, the sanctuaries. Recently,
Merkelbach suggested that the transformation of so many private estates into
temple land reflected a fundamentalist religious attitude and intended to
revive the old Carian "Tempelwirtschaft" of premonetary times. Accordingly,
a combination of "piety" and "atavism" was responsible for the programmatic
changes in the pattern of land-holding, which were reversed as Caria became
part of the Roman province of Asia. 32 Although neither of the two abstract
concepts provide a satisfactory explanation, Merkelbach's focus on the sanc-
tuaries leads us in the right direction. Moreover, he correctly points to the
fact that the leases reflect programmatic activities, that private landowners
must have been actively and publicly encouraged to sell their land.
An Allmentary Scheme for Sanctuaries
1 suggest that the Mylasean land-transfers are comparable to the Trajanic
alimentary scheme.33 This system of government aid, which provided for the
support of children in towns aIl over Italy, was financed by government
30 Cf ibid.,!. 9-14; surprisingly, the offenders were treated with polite discretion. They
were not named in the inscription but referred to vaguely as nvÉç. It is not necessarily a
"positive" event or setting which couId lead to sudden financial operations of temples.
31 How should we imagine the situation? How can Dionysius act on behalf of the
god and of the syngeneia? If there were no distinction between sacred and public funds,
why is there a different rent? Cf ROBERT, op. cif. (n. 4), p. 39.
32 Cf R. MERKELBACH, Das Repertorium der Inschriften von My/asa. Zu Th. Drew-
Bears Rezension von I.K, 34 (W. B/ümel), mit einer Hypothese über die My/aseer
Pachturkunden, in ZPE, 101 (1994), p. 306; cf SEG 44 (1994), no. 907; similarly already
A. LAUMONIER, Les cultes indigènes en Carie, Paris, 1958, p. 109, "Cette reprise des terres
par les dieux est un curieux retour". à un état de choses très ancien". selon une sorte
d'étatisme ou de communisme théocratique".
33 For the following and further details cf R. DUNCAN-JONES, The Economy of the
Roman Empire. Quantitative Studies, Cambridge, 19742 , p. 288-319; G. WOOLF, Food,
poverty and patronage. The significance of the epigraphy of the Roman alimentary sche-
mes in early imperia/lta/y, in PBSR, 58 (1990), p. 197-228; D. JOHNSTON, Munificence and
municipia: bequests to towns in classica/ Roman /aw, in]RS, 75 (1985), p. 105-125.
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grants placed with landowners in the districts; each landowner who accep-
ted a loan received a sum worth a certain percentage of the stated value of
his land, on which he had to pay the city interest, which formed the income
from which the children were supported. Rich information about the loans
has come down to us through inscriptions from the towns of Ve1eia and
Ligures Baebiani. 34 They illustrate that the farming out of loans to private
landowners was the only and most effective means for securing a permanent
revenue of a sufficient scale.35 Being a perpetuaI foundation, they were self-
contained and protected the dependants from suspension of payment in
years of deficit. In the light of this clear advantage - and in order to attract
landowners to participate - the interest-rate on the loans could be and was a
little lower than the rate mentioned as the normal return on landed invest-
ments. However, it was not the chief purpose of the scheme to provide
landowners with cheap credit. On the contrary, it would appear that partici-
pation fell under the category of civic munera. 36
Like the Roman alimentary loans at the beginning of the second century
A.D., the Mylasean land-transfers constituted a scheme designed to guaran-
tee regular, reliable income for earmarked purposes. In this case, the
Mylasean civic and religious authorities tried to solve a long-term, structural
problem that many communities and their sanctuaries faced: very often the
high costs of running the cults were not met by the existing regular sacred
revenues. Sacred funds were easily diverted and treasuries highly unstable or
spent on exceptional expenses. Sacred property had probably been gradually
diminished because private landowners encroached on the estates of the
gods. A good way to solve the problem and at the same time to free the
community from an extra burden was to increase the land leased out for the
gods.
Let us return to the texts. A few documents tell us about the purpose of
the operations from the "gods' point of view". The investment is made so
that "the gods will enjoy the revenues from sums bequeathed to them for all
times".37 When in 240 B.e. the governor of Seleucus II, Olympichus,
announced a dedication of lands to Zeus Osogoa, he referred to precisely the
same purpose.38 He suggested that the people of Mylasa lease out the dedi-
34 Cf CIL XI 1147 (= E.M. SMALLWOOD [ed.], Documents Illustrating the Principates of
Gaius, Claudius and Nero, Cambridge, 1967, no. 436) and CIL IX, 1455.
35 DUNCAN-JONES, op. cit. (n. 33), p. 296, compares the scheme with private founda-
tions.
36 Cf ibid., 295 note 5 with references; DUNCAN-JONES, p. 300, finds it "highly doubtful
whether the alimentary loans could offer any real economic attraction to borrowers,
except those who needed to be bailed out of debt."; for participation as a civic obligation
see ibid., p. 308-310.
37 IMylasa II, no. 829, 1. 4, 01tOlÇ 'toû Ùta<pôpou Ka'taÀEÀEtllllé.vou 1tpôcroùoç umxpxn 'toîç 8EOîç
Eiç 'tov a1tav'ta Xpôvov.
38 Cf ILabraunda 1, no. 8.
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cated properties on a hereditary basis at an interest of 5% so that ｾ àno
tOUtCOV npocro8oç unapXtlt tôn 8erot eç tOV ano;vto; Xpovov. 39 Olympichus him-
self will be the future lessee so that his grant works like a foundation. 4o
Sanctuaries were well-advised not only to draw revenues from existing
landed property, but also to acquire new estates as the best way of investing
sacred funds. The following statements can be found in the documents: "As
land is for sale, it is the appropriate thing to buy those properties for the
gods": cruf..t<pÉpov 8É ecr'ttv npto;cr8ar 'AnoÀ.À.covt Ko;t 'AptÉj.u8t 8wîç tO\) ＸｾｪＮｬｯｵ
'üÀ.Uj.lÉcov àno tO\) àpyuptou tO\) oVtoç iEPO\) trov npoyeYPo;j.lj.lÉvcov 8EroV. 41 Sorne
inscriptions allude to a temporary liquidity of the temple: ･ ｮ ｅ ｴ Ｘ ｾ ev tep no;pov'tt
unaPXEt trot Ｘ ｾ ｪ Ｎ ｬ ｣ ｯ ｴ 'üÀ.Uj.lÉcov iepov àpyupwv 'AnoÀ.À.covoç Ko;t 'AptÉj.lt8oç;42 a
legacy or exceptional euergetism might have been responsible for the
"sudden wealth": ･ ｮ ｅ ｴ Ｘ ｾ nicrtoç EipllVo;toU... Ko;tÉÀ.tnEV trot 'AnoÀ.À.covt Ko;t
'AptÉj.lt8t. .. àpyuptoU 8po;Xj.làç.43 However, we also note a deliberate attempt
to purchase property on behalf of a temple, although the full sum is not
immediately available. In one case, three priests, men of high rank, advance
the money and sign as responsible for the purchase.44 At Sinuri, the commis-
sioners report that they couId not find an appropriate territory for the
amount they received for a purchase.45 The leases were therefore not only a
sensible investment of unused sacred funds but a necessary means to gua-
rantee regular sacred revenues. Given this purpose, the enigmatic inscription
from Sinuri becomes clearer:it illustrates the effort to make the sanctuary's
status as landlord as permanent as possible. The lessee may change, as long
as the regular revenues are guaranteed for the shrine.46
That the focus of the programme layon the sanctuaries and that the
landowners were not desperate to sell can be seen in the case of the loçal
aristocrat Diodotus, son of Demetrius, who held a farm in joint ownership
with Cleito, the daughter of Hybreas and priestess of Apollo and Artemis;
while Demetrius sold his haIf to Zeus of the Otorkondeis, the priestess retai-
ned hers.47 It is unlikely that half of the property was an economic burden
while the other flourished. It is also understandable why only Demetrius' haIf
was involved in the sale. The priestess would not sell her property to another
39 Ibid., 1. 21.
40 Note that a copy of his' letter dates ta the late second century B.C.
41 Ibid., no. 801, 1. 2-4.
42 Ibid., no. 802, 1. 2f; cf also nos. 825 and 827.
43 Ibid., no. 829, 1. 3f.
44 Cf IMylasa II, no. 801, 1. 4-7: no. 802, 1. 5: among the 7tpOèlUVEîo'tu ... is the priest of
Zeus Labraundeus.
45 Cf ROBERT, op. cif. (n. 4), no. 50.
46 Cf ibid., no. Il.
47 Cf IMylasa l, nos. 205f.: Professor Reger discusses this case in detail in an unpubli-
shed paper (see n. 6): he knows further details regarding the estate.
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deity, nor wauld there be any need for her ta take part in the scheme; her
haIf might anyway have yielded incarne for the gods. Neither a "fundamen-
talist religious attitude", nor a revived "Tempelwirtschaft" are the right labels
for the Mylasean land-Iease documents, They derived rather from the expe-
rience that the gods needed a guaranteed income and that only the revenues
of sacred land could provide this.
Co-operation instead of Controversy
The private landowners who gave up their estates in order to become
lessees of Mylasean deities must have been encouraged by the civic authori-
ties. Obviously, the syngeneia or demes negotiated the purchase and lease of
the lands on behalf of the sanctuaries, and these civic institutions almost
functioned as buyer and lessor. Their dominant role is reflected in the title of
the territories, which are, for example, called "<puÀenKl] ril dtàç 'Otrop-
KOVOÉrov",48 Nevertheless, the frequent emphasis on both the gods and the
sacred funds must not be ignored, and twofold expressions like 'tôn 8erot Kat
'tilt cruyyeveiat or 'trov ieprov Kat KOtVroV 1tpocroorov49 show rather a distinction
of funds and revenues than that they were interchangeable, Moreover, my
interpretation has shown that the whole record is based on the fact that it
was the gods' income that was at stake,
1 wonder how the phenomenon relates to the controversy between the
priests of Labraunda and the city of Mylasa which took place sorne time
before the leases started to appear. 50 As far as we can see from the preserved
texts, Zeus Labraundeus was not involved in many transactions, but land
was also acquired in his name; his estates appear frequently when the boun-
daries of sold lands are described. If Mylasa had just "recovered" from the
serious controversy with the priests at Labraunda, the demos would have
hesitated to develop a scheme which increased sacred land dramatically.51
Although the authorities freed themselves from additional support for the
cults (and the default of such support was one of the main issues in the
controversy), they wouId not have risked that ambitious priests like Korris
should exploit the situation and daim extra revenues. Sorne decades later,
however, the relationship appears in a very different light, the atmosphere of
48 IMylasa l, no. 214, 1. 14; ·cf also IMylasa II, nos. 802 and 819, for the phrase E1tElOl]
UltlXPXEt trot ｏｾｊｬｏＩｴ tEpoV apyUptov 'AnoÎJw:Jvaç Kat 'AptÉJltooç toû ｾ ｊ ｬ ｯ ｴ ｊ SEroV.
49 Cf ROBERT, op. clf. (n. 4), nos. lOf, and 14f.; Robert simply concludes, "Les affaires
du dieu et celles de la syngeneia sont les mêmes"; ,W. BL,ÜMEL, IMylasa II, p. 74, "Er [Zeus
Otorkondeonl hatte ausgedehnten Grundbesitz, der natürlich für aile praktischen
Zwecke Grundbesitz der Phyle war".
50 Obviously, the "how long before" depends on the dating of the land-leases; a
corpus of new texts from Mylasa will hopefully allow for more certainty,
51 Cf IMylasa l, no. 102; the priest of Zeus Labraundeus is also the secretary of the
city.
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mutuaI suspicion had given way to a natural co-operation. In the second
century B.C., Mylasa and the local sanctuaries had not merged identity but
shared common interests.
My interpretation of the land-Ieases makes it clear that transactions of
this kind were a structural necessity for Greek sanctuaries and must have
taken place in most communities. The foUowing passage, which is taken
from a Rhodian inscription, illustrates a comparable context nicely: ￈ Ｑ ｴ ･ ｴ ｯ ｾ
｣ ｲ ｵ ｶ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｶ ･ ｴ 'tàç Ilèv 1toS6oouç 'tàç Atvotrov ucr'tepeîv, 'tà oè ei[ç] 'tàç Sucrtaç Kat
1tavayu[pe]tç avaÂ,(0lla'ta 1tOÂ.t.aKtÇ È1tetyetv Kat 'tou'tcp 'tp61tcp 'toùç apxov'taç eiç
ou[crXP]T]cr'ttav ÈV1tet1t'tetv, crull<pÉpov ÔÉ È<m Atvo[tot]ç K[a]t 'tà[ç 'tro]v Serov
'tetllàç Kat 'to 'tOl> [K]otvOl> 1tpÉ1tOV Ota<puÂ.u[crcr]ecrSat...52 In order to prevent
officiaIs from diverting sacred funds, the Lindians tried to find a solution that
dealt with an acute financial crisis Cparticularly with regard to sacred matters)
and furthered both the gods and the community. While Lindos and many
other cities found their solution in ad hoc measures such as subscriptions or
other forms of encouraged euergetism, Mylasa came up with the idea of
developing a special scheme, and it thus produced an exceptional epigraphic
record. 53
To sum up the evidence in one sentence: Mylasa is a unique solution to a
common problem. The foUowing remains to be stated: the fact that the gods
were the beneficiaries of an "alimentary scheme" does not deny the notion of
sacred wealth. After aU, the sanctuaries bought the large number of estates,
and by the end of the second century a vast amount of land around Mylasa
must have been sacred. However, there was a particular need to guard the
privileges and property of the gods. These were always in danger, and the
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52 F. SOKOLOWSKI, LSCG Suppl. 90, 1. 5-9 Ccf Ch. BLINKENBERG, Lindos. Fouilles de
l'acropole, 1902-1924 II. Inscriptions, Berlin, 1941, no. 419; 1. MIGEOTTE, Les souscriptions
publiques dans les cités grecques, Geneva, 1992, no. 41).
53 Though a different and very complex phenomenon, the "sales of priesthoods" in
cities of Asia Minor and the eastern Aegean would appear to be another answer to the
same problem.
